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Abstract
This paper explores a model of “semantic cognition” first de-
scribed in Rogers et al. (2004). This model was shown to re-
produce the behaviour of neurological patients who perform
poorly on a variety of tests of semantic knowledge; thus pur-
porting to provide a comprehensive explanation for semantic
deficits as found in patients with semantic dementia and, as ex-
tended in Lambon Ralph, Lowe, and Rogers (2007), individu-
als with herpes simplex virus encephalitis. Therefore, not only
does the model emulate these semantic impairments, it also
underpins a theoretical account of such memory disturbances.
We report preliminary results arising from an attempted reim-
plementation of the Rogers et al. model. Specifically, while we
were able to successfully reimplement the fully-functioning
model and recreate “normal” behaviour, our attempts to repli-
cate the behaviour of semantically impaired patients by lesion-
ing the model were mixed. Our results suggest that while se-
mantic impairments reminiscent of patients may arise when
the Rogers et al. model is lesioned, such impairments are not a
necessary consequence of the model. We discuss the implica-
tions of these apparently negative results for the Rogers et al.
account of semantic cognition.
Keywords: semantic memory model; semantic dementia;
backpropagation through time.
Introduction
Several connectionist models of “semantic cognition” have
been developed. The goal of such models is to reproduce
results obtained from testing both healthy and semantically
compromised individuals on tests held to tap semantic knowl-
edge. This is accomplished by first teaching the model to
function like a healthy semantic system and then by “damag-
ing” the model in a way that parallels the lesions seen in pa-
tients. Typically, models implement a theoretical framework
that aims to explain the semantic system in both a normal
and degenerate state, and evidence in support of the frame-
work is adduced by appealing to the behaviour of the fully-
functioning and lesioned model.
A complete understanding of semantic deficits, and of se-
mantic memory in general, has not yet been reached. How-
ever sophisticated attempts to account for the deficits of some
of the patient populations have been made, such as the Rogers
et al. (2004) model. This model proposes that a central
amodal semantic “hub” is reciprocally linked to modality-
specific “spokes”, which themselves extend into so-called
modal pathways. This connectivity allows fully grounded
perceptual input to give rise to amodal abstract concepts. In
other words, the hub itself creates semantic representations
via its recurrent connections to sensory regions of the brain.
The hub model developed by Rogers et al. (2004), and then
extended in Lambon Ralph et al. (2007), is one of the most
complete models of human semantic deficits, boasting both
an account of semantic dementia, a global semantic mem-
ory disorder, and herpes simplex virus encephalitis, a cause
of intra-semantic deficits. This paper reports results derived
from an attempted reimplementation of the hub model, per-
formed initially as a step towards extending the model and
underlying theoretical framework to provide an account for
additional semantic disorders. During the process of explor-
ing this model, it became apparent that some of the results re-
ported in Rogers et al., obtained from modelling clinical tests
of semantic knowledge, were not robust. That is, the Rogers
et al. results are not a necessary consequence of the model
as described. This suggests that the computational-level de-
scription of the human semantic system offered by Rogers et
al. is under-specified.
Semantic Cognition
The semantic memory system refers to a part of human long
term memory consisting of a collection of abstract facts about
the world. Semantic knowledge underpins linguistic mean-
ing, providing a substrate for reasoning and inference, for cat-
egorisation, and for the creation of prototypes or exemplars.
It intuitively appears that semantic memory is an abstraction
or generalisation over a set of experiences collected gradu-
ally over time and organised hierarchically, as first proposed
by Collins and Quillian (1969).
Semantic cognition pertains to the process by which a non-
or pre-semantic percept (e.g., a drawing of a dog, or the word
“dog”) gives rise to a collection of related semantic memories
(e.g., dogs are fury, and have four legs) that endow the percept
with meaning. The reflex-like recollection of this knowledge
produces a response related to the specific concept (e.g., iden-
tifying a line-drawing by saying: “dog”). Such a reaction is
only possible if the relationship between the purely percep-
tual stimulus and its meaning has already been instantiated
in the mind (e.g., an image of a dog is linked to the pho-
netics of the word “dog”). This definition implies semantic
cognition can be explored using tasks that require a correct
interpretation, and thus response, when probed with an ap-
propriate stimulus. Four such tasks are used by Rogers et al.
(2004) to assess both their participants’ and their model’s ap-
titude; these are: confrontation naming, where an appropriate
verbal name must be provided for a picture; word-to-picture
matching, where a linguistic label must be paired with its cor-
responding picture from a selection that includes distractors;
sorting, where a selection of words or pictures must be classi-
fied under hierarchical categories; and drawing, copying and
delayed copying, where three sketches must be created, the
first recreated purely from memory in response to a word, the
second by direct copy from a line-drawing, and the third from
memory a short time after the direct copying subtask.
Patients with dramatically low scores on such tests were
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first described by Warrington (1975). Her patients, who were
in their early sixties, were tested on many aspects of their
cognitive functioning in order to isolate their deficit as one
of pure semantics and not one of an intellectual, perceptual,
or linguistic nature. The set of behavioural symptoms found,
coupled with progressive bilateral neurodegeneration of the
anterior temporal lobes, are characteristic of a disorder that
has come to be known as semantic dementia (SD), a variant of
frontotemporal dementia. As seen in Warrington’s study and
in the many more that followed, SD causes a severe impair-
ment of semantic knowledge, with patients performing better
when tested on familiar or typical items as opposed to novel
or exceptional ones.
The degenerative nature of SD appears to cause patients’
semantic skills to disappear in a process of akin to the reverse
of learning. This, along with the characteristics of other se-
mantic disorders, hints at some form of functionally distinct
hierarchical system in which structural damage is intrinsically
linked with, and gives rise to, functional deficiencies.
The Hub Model
Overview
A central claim of the hub model of Rogers et al. (2004) is that
the interactions of attractors, which develop through learning
to represent amodal concepts within semantic space, can ac-
count for both healthy and deficient semantic cognition. At-
tractors are stable network states that emerge following train-
ing if recurrent connectivity exists within a connectionist net-
work. When activation is allowed to propagate throughout
the trained network in a cyclic fashion, the network’s state
(as represented by the set of hidden and visible unit states)
will converge to one such stable configuration. These stable
network states exercise attractive power over a set of neigh-
bouring network states, collectively known as their basin of
attractor, such that if the network is in any of these “nearby”
states it will ultimately settle to the attractor itself. These
properties, according to Rogers et al., are also found in se-
mantic memory.
To evaluate their framework Rogers et al. (2004) develop
a recurrent connectionist network model. A set of stimuli is
created based on statistically analysed features of common
percepts (McRae & Cree, 2002), which the model is taught
to auto-associate. Post-training, the model scores on tests of
semantic cognition in accordance with healthy participants.
After lesioning, the impaired model exhibits deficits compa-
rable to those of SD and HSVE patients. Thus, Rogers et al.
conclude that their architecture captures some level of the in-
ternal mechanisms and sophistication of the human semantic
system.
Structure and Processing in the Hub Model
The recurrent connectionist network of Rogers et al. (2004)
consists of one layer of 215 visible units and one layer of 64
hidden units. The latter are fully connected both to them-
selves and to the visible units, which are divided into three
in/output pools each consisting of: 40 name units, 64 visual
feature units, and 111 verbal (61 perceptual, 32 functional,
and 18 encyclopaedic) descriptor units. All units have real-
valued time-varying activations with a range of [0,1] and a
bias set to −2. The hidden units, through learning, come to
represent a kind of amodal semantics associated with feature
patterns represented at the visible units.
As discussed above, the stimuli on which the network is
trained and tested are binary patterns with co-variance that
reflects statistical properties of real-world concepts. These
are directly applied to the name, verbal, and visual units.
Name sub-patterns are a set of binary digits, of which only
one unit may be active per pattern, i.e., they are defined or-
thogonally. Rogers et al. (2004) argue that this labelling strat-
egy parallels natural language in as much as, for example, the
word “robin” does not in itself carry any information about
the bird to which it refers. In contrast, the visual and ver-
bal sub-patterns represent perceptual and linguistic informa-
tion, and therefore must conform to predefined prototypes.
Visual properties and verbal descriptors represent statements
like “has a red breast”, “can fly”, and facts such as “is a bird”
and “is living”.
To produce a response given a sub-pattern the network ef-
fectively performs pattern completion. It propagates activa-
tions until it reaches a stable state in which hidden unit states
do not change on successive cycles. Once the trained network
has settled, its semantic state conforms to the real-valued pat-
tern of an implicitly learned attractor, an internal configura-
tion that is reachable due to the recurrent connectivity of the
hidden units. This in turn activates the output units, thus com-
pleting the input pattern.
Training Strategy
Pattern Set The set of patterns used by Rogers et al. (2004)
to train the hub model has some very particular properties.
Specifically, it contains some patterns in which visual and
verbal sub-patterns are mapped onto the same name. The
sharing of name sub-patterns is held to be analogous to the
way a chicken, a robin, and a sparrow can all be called
birds, both individually and collectively. What this amounts
to here is, for example, 3 nondescript birds sharing the su-
perordinate level name “BIRD”; forming a unidirectional 3-
to-1 mapping from the three pairs of visual and verbal sub-
patterns to a single name label. Conversely, if given “BIRD”
their network “learned to generate visual and verbal proper-
ties common to most [birds]” (Rogers et al., 2004, p. 214).
Based on the statistical properties of visual and verbal co-
occurrences within various categories reported by McRae and
Cree (2002), Rogers et al. constructed a set of 48 patterns,
with 8 patterns for each of 6 categories (mammals, birds,
tools, vehicles, household objects and fruits, although only
the first four have associated category-level exemplars), and
40 unique names.
In order to replicate the hub model, we constructed a sta-
tistically equivalent set of patterns, based on the probabilistic
prototype for pattern creation given in fig. 3 of Rogers et al.
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(2004). A comparison of the resulting dendrogram showing
pattern similarity with that of fig. 2 of Rogers et al. confirms
the two pattern sets are equivalent in structure.
Learning Algorithm The learning algorithm used by the
original network is described only as “a variant of the back-
propagation learning algorithm suited to learning in a recur-
rent network” (Rogers et al., 2004, p. 208). J. L. McClel-
land (personal communication, 2011) confirmed that this was
a variant of backpropagation through time (BPTT), with the
network “unrolled” (allowed to run) for 28 time-steps (Rogers
et al., 2004, p. 215).
In the work reported here we adopt classic epochwise
BPTT (Williams & Zipser, 1995, p. 447, eq. 18-19), with
a learning rate of 0.001 and with time-averaging applied to
post-synaptic unit states (McClelland, 2011). Time-averaging
is a statistical method of noise reduction that may be applied
over any time-varying property of a dynamic system. It has
the ability to increase the signal-to-noise ratio and, in this
case, results in a decrease in training epochs and for more
complex mappings to be internalised, given the training de-
tails in Rogers et al. (2004)
Healthy Behaviour of Hub Model
After training for 15,000 cycles, our replication of the Rogers
et al. (2004) network robustly maps names to visual and ver-
bal sub-patterns. Thus, given a name such as “chicken”, the
visual and verbal units of the network take on patterns (once
the network has settled) that correspond to the visual and ver-
bal features associated with “chicken”. Similarly, when given
the visual features of that pattern, the other visible units take
on values associated with the name and verbal features of the
pattern. More critically, when given a superordinate name the
sets of units corresponding to visual and verbal sub-patterns
take on states that amount to the weighted average of the three
nondescript patterns that share that same name. Conversely,
when provided with the visual or verbal descriptors the net-
work activates the general-level name. This demonstrates that




We tested our network on each of the four tasks described
in the introduction. In each case the method used to probe
the network consists of: keeping the relevant input constant
while running the network for 12 time-steps; then allowing
the network to settle without any externally applied input un-
til equilibrium is reached; and finally comparing the states of
the units in the pool currently of interest to those in the rel-
evant pattern. This is as described in Rogers et al. (2004).
Following training, our network functions in its healthy state
at the same general levels as Rogers et al., both in terms of
training error and on all four tasks. It is therefore appropriate
to consider the network’s behaviour following lesioning.
Semantic:ti :ti :ti :
Superordinate:r r i t :r r i t :r r i t :
Crossdomain:r i :r i :r i :











































































































































1.0... 0.9... 0.8... 0.7... 0.6... 0.5... 0.4... 0.3... 0.2... 0.1... 0.0...
Figure 1: Results of the confrontation naming task: each data
point represents the proportion of error for each type at a per-
centage of connections lesioned: from 0% to 90% in incre-
ments of 10%. (Compare with Rogers et al., 2004, fig. 6.)
Lesioning the Model
Rogers et al. (2004) lesioned the original hub model by in-
discriminately globally severing connections between units.
This zeroing of the weights is claimed to be a sufficient ana-
logue to the damage seen in the temporal lobes of SD pa-
tients. By removing randomly selected connections in in-
creasing percentages Rogers et al. maintain that the network
displays neurodegeneration-like behaviour reflecting the de-
cay in SD. This approach is mirrored in our replication, with
semantic testing performed on three of the four standard tests
described previously. Each lesion begins from a random se-
lection of weights and is then increased, as would occur over
time to an SD sufferer. For each task this is done 50 times at
10 levels of damage (i.e., from 0% to 90% of connections re-
moved); paralleling 50 SD patients tested at 10 stages of pro-
gressive degeneration. Once the network is lesioned, settling
becomes increasingly difficult and may result in dramatically
different responses given the same input; thus the all results
are based on sampling the current implementation 10 times
for each of the sub-patterns it is tested on.
Confrontation Naming
Recall that confrontation naming requires subjects to gener-
ate verbal labels (names) from visual input (pictures). Rogers
et al. (2004) report data on this task from 15 SD patients. At
the earlier stages of degeneration, omissions, when the partic-
ipant gives no answer, are relatively few but they increase dra-
matically as time goes by, until the only errors are omissions,
i.e., the individual is completely anomic. Superordinate er-
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rors, so called because the response is not the expected name
(e.g., “owl”), but something more general (e.g., “bird”), seem
to follow a similar trend to omission errors. However, at the
most severe stages of the disease, superordinate errors drop
off due to anomia. Semantic errors occur when the response
is from the same category as the line-drawing presented (e.g.,
“dog”, when the correct answer is “horse”); these errors are
low initially, then rise, and finally return to a low level (again
due to anomia). Cross-domain errors, where a response is
given from the opposing domain to that which the stimulus
belongs to (e.g., calling a “horse” a “car”), are almost never
documented in the SD sample.
The results of our replication of the confrontation naming
task are shown in fig. 1; however, the trends shown in the be-
haviour of the SD patients described above and the modelling
results of Rogers et al. (2004) are not shown here. In regards
to our model, the largest proportion of errors from 10% to
70% of weights lesioned are cross-domain errors. This means
that name units corresponding, for example, to artifacts are
activated when an animal is visually presented to the network
and vice versa. Omission errors are defined by Rogers et al.
to occur when the network fails to activate any name unit be-
yond a threshold of 0.5. Changing this threshold affects the
relations between the error types, but does not result in a bet-
ter fit to patient data. The greater the threshold the more er-
rors are classified as omissions, and thus the remaining three
kinds of naming error (semantic, cross-domain, and superor-
dinate) are fewer; the inverse also holds. In conclusion, the
reimplementation of the hub model on the naming task does
not recreate the error pattern seen in the patients.
Sorting Words and Pictures
This task requires the network to classify name and visual
sub-patterns into their respective categories and domains. In
fig. 2, a graph of the network’s performance at sorting at in-
creasing levels of lesioning is shown. The scores for the two
general levels of sorting (represented as solid lines), for words
and for pictures, follow a descent from correct to chance lev-
els. This is expected due to the architecture of the patterns:
there are two encyclopaedic units that represent the mutually
exclusive facts “is an animal” and “is an artifact”. In much
the same way, the network’s scores on the two specific sort-
ing tasks also appear to deteriorate to chance level, this time
as there are 5 categories to choose from chance is at 0.2 (as in
Rogers et al., 2004, fruit is excluded in the testing phase).
These results are relatively similar to those produced by
the 12 patients tested by Rogers et al. (2004), however, there
appears to be an important difference: the SD patients retain
the ability to classify pictures into their respective domains
well into their illness. Thus, while sorting into lower level
categories is a skill that is largely lost, the two main semantic
domains remain intact in SD; this also can be seen in fig. 8 of
Rogers et al. While the original hub model appears to capture
this dissociation, the current implementation does not. Ar-
guably, the sorting of pictures is slightly more preserved than
that of words, in fig. 2, but the SD patients are all at ceiling.
General Words:r l r :r l r :r l r :
Specific Words:ifi  r :ifi  r :ifi  r :
General Pictures:r l i t r :r l i t r :r l i t r :






























































































0.0... 10.0... 20.0... 30.0... 40.0... 50.0... 60.0... 70.0... 80.0... 90.0... 100.0...
Figure 2: Results of the sorting task on words and on pictures.
Error bars indicate one standard error (SE) about the mean.
(Compare with Rogers et al., 2004, fig. 8.)
Again, the model is unable to fully capture this pattern of SD
patient performance.
Drawing and Delayed Copying
This semantic test involves creating drawings given a name
and copies based on visual sub-patterns. The results obtained
from running the drawing and delayed copying semantic test
on the reimplementation (see fig. 3) appear to qualitatively
match those in fig. 11 of Rogers et al. (2004). Both SD
patients and the model show an increase in the errors they
make when drawing and copying. Also the difference be-
tween drawing and delayed copying, that the former is more
difficult than the latter per patient, is reflected in both the orig-
inal model and our reimplementation.
However, when the results are further analysed, as in figs.
4 and 5, a different picture emerges. Rogers et al. (2004) ar-
gue that there is an underlying distinction between the scores
in each domain for two kinds of error: an omission, a salient
feature that should have been drawn but is left out by the par-
ticipant (e.g., forgetting to depict a swan with wings); and an
intrusion, a property that perhaps holds for most exemplars
but is incorrectly included in the drawing (e.g., adding four
legs to a swan). In the patients’ drawings there are signifi-
cantly more intrusions for animals than for artifacts (Rogers
et al., 2004, p. 227), but no such effect for omissions. In
fact, the original hub model only partially reproduces these
effects, correctly showing more intrusions for animals but in-
correctly showing more omissions for artifacts (see figs. 12-
13 in Rogers et al., 2004). In our reimplementation of the
hub model, we found that omission errors (both when copy-
ing and drawing) are higher in artifacts over animals (see
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Drawing:r i :r i :r i :






























































































































0.0... 10.0... 20.0... 30.0... 40.0... 50.0... 60.0... 70.0... 80.0... 90.0...
Figure 3: Mean overall feature errors per drawing for the
drawing and delayed copying task for each lesioning level.
Error bars not included because SE < 0.002. (Compare with
Rogers et al., 2004, fig. 11.)
Animals:i l :i l :i l :





















































































































































































































































0.0... 10.0... 20.0... 30.0... 40.0... 50.0... 60.0... 70.0... 80.0... 90.0...
Figure 4: Proportion of errors of omission per drawing for
each domain for the drawing and delayed copying task. SE <
0.003. (Compare with Rogers et al., 2004, fig. 12.)
Animals:i l :i l :i l :











































































































































































































































































































0.0... 10.0... 20.0... 30.0... 40.0... 50.0... 60.0... 70.0... 80.0... 90.0...
Figure 5: Proportion of intrusion errors per drawing for each
domain in the drawing and delayed copying task. SE < 0.105.
(Compare with Rogers et al., 2004, fig. 13.)
fig. 4), though with increased lesioning severity omission er-
rors seem to occur equally in both domains (in contrast to
patients, who show no effect; while the original hub model
shows the same effect as our model). The rate of intrusion er-
rors by domain reflects neither the patient data nor that of the
original hub implementation, with more intrusion errors for
artifacts than animals over most of the range of lesion sever-
ity (see fig. 5).
Discussion
Rogers et al. (2004) presented a model of the semantic system
which they argued could account, when lesioned, for many of
the deficits associated with semantic dementia. In support of
this argument they report a number of simulations. We have
attempted to replicate these simulations, but with mixed suc-
cess. Thus, while we were able to recreate the basic learning
performance of the model, we were unable to fully reproduce
the patterns seen in the lesion studies.
Rogers et al. (2004) parallel the emergence of attractors
with the learning of concepts, and propose that such knowl-
edge is amodal: the somato-sensory input from the vari-
ous modality-specific pathways is encapsulated by the hid-
den units, which thus form semantic representations. This
basic theoretical notion is successfully captured by the hub
model. For the case of the deficits seen in their SD patients,
Rogers et al. appeal to the attractor basins’ properties post-
lesioning (zeroing of connection weights). They claim that
animals are a tight cluster of similar concepts, thus consist-
ing of many neighbouring attractors, while attractors for arti-
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facts are distal (to the average central point of their domain),
which means they form distinct conceptual loci in semantic
space, and therefore their attractors are further apart. When
connections are zeroed the attractor basins for living creatures
are held to decay to form a larger super-attractor, which has
a combined attractive power; meaning categorisation of in-
put as an animal is possible, but access to individual features
might be lost. Conversely, the attractor basins of non-living
things do not merge; instead they maintain their individual at-
tractors, albeit with distorted basins, allowing slightly better
performance in this domain. The evidence put forward for the
this phenomenon is the series of graphs generated from test-
ing the Rogers et al. model. Yet the behaviour reported in the
original hub model is not found in the network trained here.
Why might this be so?
One possibility is that there is an error in our replication.
We do not believe this to be the case, particularly given that
we have simulated the basic learning performance of the net-
work. A second is that the difference in results relates to
some difference between, for example, the learning algorithm
as implemented here and as implemented by Rogers et al.
(2004). This is certainly possible, given that the algorithm is
not fully described in the original publication. A third is that
the attractors formed by the model are dependent upon the
initial random weights of connections prior to learning or the
order of exemplars in the training set. However, if either of
these latter two situations is the case then it calls into question
the theoretical explanation offered by Rogers et al. for their
results.
An important aspect of this modelling strategy, that is re-
lated to the formation of attractors, is the claimed distribution
of pre-semantic (perceptual and functional) features: animals
and plants are closely perceptually related to each other (due
to the fact they have evolved from a common ancestor and
thus are composed of generally similar body parts); whereas
tools, vehicles, and other inanimate objects are not similar to
each other (as they have been created by humans to solve dif-
ferent problems, so by definition artifacts are distinct from
both living things and from each other). Without training
sets that encode patterns in this specific way, no connection-
ist model would be capable of producing a good fit to pa-
tient data. On this argument, the features, whose extraction
from the environment itself is not modelled, play a pivotal
role in giving rise to the semantic system’s structure, and this
is the case regardless of the network topology (be it recur-
rent or feedforward) or the learning algorithm. This is to say
that, to a large extent, input to the semantic system should
drive its organisation and dictate the way semantic knowl-
edge will decay. Despite this fact, the patterns used here are
unable to affect the internal structure of the reimplemented
hub model in the way needed when the network is damaged.
This means that the qualitative and consistent effects required
post-lesioning are in fact not guaranteed merely by the struc-
ture of the training set. It appears that lesioning the recurrent
network model by severing connections does not necessarily
result in the kind of well-behaved breakdown and generalisa-
tion of attractors as supposed by Rogers et al.
To summarise, the differences between the models appear
to be due to the results obtained in Rogers et al. (2004) de-
pending on some unarticulated implementation detail. If this
is so, then the required behaviour is not a necessary conse-
quence of the model − the original model is underspecified
(perhaps our implementation of the BPTT algorithm yields
attractors with different properties to the implementation of
Rogers et al.). Alternatively, it may be that the behaviour
of the network when damaged depends upon, for example,
some apparently irrelevant factor such as the random initial-
isation of the connection weights. Whatever the underlying
cause of the discrepancy, further investigation is needed to
discover exactly why the results obtained here differ from
most of those detailed in Rogers et al. If their results are in
fact reproducible, but require a very specific set-up, this sug-
gests that the model as previously reported is insufficiently
specified. Conversely, if the success of the original model is
due to an artefact or randomly occurring noise then this indi-
cates that in models of this type it is critical to present results
from multiple trained models, rather than from just one, to
establish whether behaviours are a necessary consequence of
the model or merely one of several possible outcomes.
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